Where Nation-building went wrong in Afghanistan.

I have argued that Dick Cheney's US military version of nation-building was a success in Iraq and could have been more successful in Afghanistan. 

Events in Iraq over time have shown that wholesale re-modeling the governmental and to an extent the society works with a significant emendation: namely, an accepted leader that has support of the people.

Thus, with al-Sadr, an individual I believe that could be a vital unifier of the diverse groups, Iraq should be well on its way to becoming a new nation, far different from that under Hussein.

In Afghanistan, however, the cities of the country have more of an opportunity to join modern society as compared to the hinterlands, still mired in the traditional Muslim faith that embraces Shira law and interferes with modern governance of society by creating religious states, viz., the caliphates.

But the government in Kabul had barely control of its own environs less more that of the manifold cities of the entire country.  That meant the Taliban could infiltrate the urban communities--linger on--and dominate the rural populace, too.  There was strong reluctance at home for the US to become involved in the Afghan countryside, especially where the growing of plants was used in the making of drugs--I am led to believe.  So, to my mind, it would have taken much longer to become a transformed new nation-state.  Yet, largely through the use of US contractors, the population was slowly becoming Westernized nonetheless.  (Thanks to Blackwell.)